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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 James P. Carroll, trustee of debtor Jeffrey J. Prosser’s 
bankruptcy estate, appeals the District Court’s order vacating 
the Bankruptcy Court’s imposition of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
sanctions.  The Bankruptcy Court imposed sanctions because 
of the numerous and inflammatory submissions Prosser’s 
counsel filed in Prosser’s bankruptcy and associated 
adversary proceeding.  Because these filings vexatiously and 
unnecessarily multiplied the bankruptcy proceedings and the 
Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing 
such sanctions, we will reverse the District Court’s order 
vacating them. 
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I 
 
Prosser filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 2006.  
His petition was converted to a Chapter 7 petition and Carroll 
was appointed as trustee of Prosser’s estate.  During the 
relevant portion of his bankruptcy proceedings, Prosser was 
represented by attorneys Norman Abood, Robert Craig, and 
Lawrence Schoenbach (collectively, the “Prosser Counsel”), 
and Carroll was represented by Fox Rothschild, LLP (“Fox 
Rothschild”). 
 
A trial took place in 2008 to adjudicate creditors’ 
objections to Prosser’s claim that certain property was exempt 
from the bankruptcy proceedings (the “Exemptions Trial”).  
Arthur Stelzer, Prosser’s former “valet and personal 
assistant,” App. 2652, testified for the creditors.  He testified 
that Prosser asked him to destroy several of Prosser’s 
computer hard drives after Prosser filed for bankruptcy.  
Based in part on Stelzer’s testimony, the Bankruptcy Court 
denied the exemptions Prosser claimed.  Thereafter, Carroll 
and others initiated an adversary proceeding, seeking denial 
of Prosser’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a), based on 
evidence that “the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, 
falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded 
information . . . from which the debtor’s financial condition 
or business transactions might be ascertained.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 727(a)(3). 
 
In connection with this adversary proceeding, Prosser 
deposed Stelzer in an effort to undermine his testimony at the 
Exemptions Trial.  During the January 12, 2010 deposition, at 
which the Bankruptcy Judge presided, the Prosser Counsel 
inquired into the payment of Stelzer’s legal fees by third 
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parties and contacts Stelzer had with Carroll and Carroll’s 
counsel.  With respect to his legal fees, Stelzer explained that 
he had felt “intimidated” and “frightened” when first served 
with a subpoena in connection with the Exemptions Trial and 
that prompted him to seek legal representation.  App. 81.  
Stelzer explained that these legal fees were paid either by the 
debtor companies or by the law firm representing the trustee 
in a separate but related Chapter 11 proceeding.  When asked 
whether, as a result of this arrangement, Stelzer had an 
“understanding” that he would do something “in exchange for 
them paying for [his] fees,” he replied, “[w]ell, if I’m called 
for whatever, just to come tell the truth.”  App. 80, 82. 
 
As to Stelzer’s contact with Carroll, Dana Katz, a Fox 
Rothschild attorney representing Carroll, stated to the 
Bankruptcy Judge that Carroll had “never spoken to Mr. 
Stelzer outside of trial testimony during the exemptions 
proceedings.”  App. 61.  Stelzer, however, testified that he 
and Carroll once had dinner together “long before” Stelzer 
testified at the Exemptions Trial.  App. 77.  According to 
Stelzer, they discussed “how [Stelzer’s] life was just in 
general,” “general, light conversation,” “[t]he wine [they] had 
for dinner,” and “what it was like to work for Mr. Prosser, 
Mrs. Prosser, and the children, general, really general 
chitchat.”  Id.  Stelzer testified that he and Carroll did not 
discuss Prosser’s hard drives, Prosser’s finances, or the 
possibility that Stelzer might later be called to testify in a 
future proceeding such as the Exemptions Trial. 
 
Two weeks later, on January 26, 2010, the Prosser 
Counsel filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing into what 
they labeled an alleged bribery scheme, asserting that Stelzer 
gave unfavorable testimony during the Exemptions Trial in 
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exchange for “payment of his attorney fees in multiple 
litigations,” App. 181, and that Carroll’s counsel had 
misrepresented Carroll’s contacts with Stelzer.1  The District 
Court referred the motion to the Bankruptcy Judge on January 
29, 2010.  That same day, the parties coincidentally appeared 
before the Bankruptcy Court to address other matters.  During 
the January 29, 2010 hearing, the Bankruptcy Court discussed 
the Prosser Counsel’s motion for an evidentiary hearing and 
suggested it be opened as a “miscellaneous adversary” 
proceeding.2 
 
During that hearing, William Stassen, a Fox 
Rothschild attorney, addressed the contacts between Carroll 
and Stelzer.  He informed the Bankruptcy Court that Katz’s 
statement that Carroll and Stelzer had never met prior to the 
Exemptions Trial was inaccurate and that Carroll had in fact 
                                                 
1 That same day, the Prosser Counsel also filed a 
motion to stay trial in the separate adversary proceeding 
relating to Prosser’s request for a discharge. 
2 “Miscellaneous proceedings” and “adversary actions” 
are familiar vehicles for court proceedings, but an amalgam 
called a “miscellaneous adversary” is not, and the reference 
appears to be simply a misstatement when the Bankruptcy 
Court intended to propose the filing of a miscellaneous 
proceeding.  That conclusion is borne out by the Court’s later 
statement in a memorandum opinion that “Prosser was 
ordered to file the [motion for a hearing] in the main 
bankruptcy case . . . pending in the Bankruptcy Division so 
that the Court could open a Miscellaneous Proceeding but 
[the Prosser Counsel] filed this Adversary instead.”  App. 466 
n.2. 
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met Stelzer for dinner before Fox Rothschild became 
Carroll’s counsel.  Stassen stated: 
 
[W]e will submit to the Court a corrected 
statement for the Court’s record.  Quite frankly, 
Your Honor, Ms. Katz is devastated.  I mean, 
she’s really upset that she made the 
representation to the Court.  I can say 
emphatically that it was clearly not a knowing 
statement with regard to [Carroll] not having 
contact with Mr. Stelzer. 
 
App. 596.3  The Bankruptcy Court acknowledged Stassen’s 
statement without comment, and the hearing moved on to 
other matters. 
 
On January 31, 2010, apparently in response to the 
District Court’s referral of their motion for an evidentiary 
hearing to the Bankruptcy Court, the Prosser Counsel issued a 
press release entitled “HEARING ORDERED ON BRIBERY 
SCHEME” in which they stated that Prosser was “the target 
of [an] alleged bribery scheme” through which Stelzer was 
provided with free legal services “in exchange for his 
testimony.”  App. 598.  The following day, the Prosser 
Counsel filed an adversary complaint (the “Adversary 
Complaint”) in Bankruptcy Court against Carroll and Fox 
Rothschild, among others, on the basis of their “apparent 
                                                 
3 On February 12, 2010, Katz filed a certification with 
the Bankruptcy Court to correct the record, stating she had 
learned after the deposition that Carroll “had met one time 
with Mr. Stelzer prior to his deposition in February 2008.”  
App. 109. 
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bribery” of Stelzer.  App. 4.  The Adversary Complaint 
repeated the allegation from their press release that Stelzer 
had been provided “free legal services . . . in exchange for his 
testimony.”  App. 598.  It also quoted Stelzer’s deposition 
testimony about his dinner with Carroll and asserted that 
Carroll was “attempt[ing] to distance [himself] from Mr. 
Stelzer,” as shown by his counsel’s statement that he and 
Stelzer had never interacted.  App. 46.  The Adversary 
Complaint contended that Fox Rothschild had “violated their 
duty of candor to the Court” by failing to report the alleged 
bribery scheme.  App. 42.  It further alleged that Carroll had 
failed to report this possible bribery scheme to the United 
States Attorney as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3057.4  The 
Adversary Complaint sought discovery and a hearing “to 
determine whether sanctions, disqualification and/or referral 
for further disciplinary proceedings should be imposed.”  
App. 3. 
 
The same day the Prosser Counsel filed the Adversary 
Complaint, they also filed two objections to Carroll’s and Fox 
Rothschild’s quarterly applications for compensation and 
reimbursement of expenses (the “Fee Objections”), 
contending that “serious questions ha[d] arisen with regard to 
the conduct of [Carroll] and/or his [c]ounsel as [were] more 
                                                 
4 This statute provides, in pertinent part, that if a 
bankruptcy trustee has “reasonable grounds for believing” 
that a violation of federal law “relating to insolvent debtors 
. . . has been committed,” the trustee “shall report to the 
appropriate United States attorney all the facts and 
circumstances of the case, the names of the witnesses and the 
offense or offenses believed to have been committed.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3057(a). 
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fully detailed in the Adversary Complaint.”  App. 249-50.  
The following day, February 2, 2010, the Prosser Counsel 
filed a motion for a hearing regarding an alleged conflict of 
interest between Carroll and his attorneys (the “Conflicts 
Motion”) arising from payment of Stelzer’s legal fees from 
estate assets in exchange for Stelzer’s testimony.  The 
Conflicts Motion argued that Stelzer and Carroll’s attorneys 
“may have engaged in criminal activity (i.e. bribery).”  App. 
103. 
 
On March 10, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed 
the motion for an evidentiary hearing underlying the 
Adversary Complaint as against Fox Rothschild, holding that, 
“[b]ased on the corrections made orally by Fox Rothschild 
during the omnibus motions hearing on January 29, 2010 and 
in writing thereafter, it is clear that there is no issue in dispute 
with regard to the veracity of the representation.”  App. 468 
(footnote omitted).  That same day, the Bankruptcy Court 
denied the Conflicts Motion, holding that Carroll was not 
represented by conflicted counsel, that no specific conduct 
had been identified warranting an evidentiary hearing as to 
Carroll, and that the Conflicts Motion was based on Sixth 
Amendment law generally applicable only in criminal 
proceedings.  On March 15, 2010, the Prosser Counsel 
voluntarily dismissed the claims embodied in the motion for 
an evidentiary hearing as against Carroll individually and 
withdrew the Fee Objections.5 
                                                 
5 After the claims against Carroll were dismissed, the 
Bankruptcy Court asked the United States Trustee to refer the 
allegations to the United States Attorney, but it stated that it 
did so only because the allegations were serious, not because 
it perceived a factual basis for the bribery accusation.  The 
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On April 2, 2010, Carroll moved for legal fees and 
expenses against the Prosser Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, contending that the Adversary Complaint, the Fee 
Objections, and the Conflicts Motion “were so patently 
meritless that the Court can reach no conclusion other than 
that they were vexatiously filed for the purpose of multiplying 
the proceedings.”  App. 560. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court granted Carroll’s § 1927 motion 
against the Prosser Counsel.  It found that “the litigation 
against Fox Rothschild should never have been initiated,” as 
the misstatement that Carroll and Stelzer had never met prior 
to the Exemptions Trial “was a mistake, promptly corrected, 
and the matter could have been resolved without this suit by a 
simple phone call between counsel and the subsequent 
corrected statement to the Court.”  App. 1609.  The 
Bankruptcy Court explicitly concluded that the Prosser 
Counsel had “unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied 
proceedings in bad faith, constituting [a] violation of 28 
U.S.C. § 1927[,] by filing” the Adversary Complaint, the Fee 
Objections, and the Conflicts Motion, App. 1609,6 and 
ultimately awarded Carroll $137,024.02 for the expenses 
associated with these filings and related proceedings.7 
                                                                                                             
Bankruptcy Court ultimately decided that referral for a 
criminal or disciplinary investigation was unwarranted. 
6 Relatedly, the Bankruptcy Court stated at an earlier 
hearing in 2010 that it was “delayed from getting to the merits 
of particular motions because of all the subsidiary litigation, 
most of which seems to not have a great deal of merit.”  Supp. 
App. 109. 
7 In a later opinion and order filed on December 20, 
2011, the Bankruptcy Court spent nearly 110 pages 
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The Prosser Counsel appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
sanctions order to the District Court.  On February 14, 2014, 
the District Court held that the Bankruptcy Court erred by 
imposing sanctions.  The District Court held that the 
Adversary Complaint and the Fee Objections could not have 
“multiplied” the adversary proceedings under § 1927 because 
§ 1927 does not apply to a filing that initiates a proceeding, 
and the Fee Objections had been filed in the bankruptcy case, 
not the adversary proceeding.  The District Court also stated 
that the Bankruptcy Court had not explained how the Prosser 
Counsel’s actions were in bad faith, noting that “the litigation 
against Carroll was of limited duration” and that, while some 
evidence in the record suggested bad faith, other evidence 
suggested the Prosser Counsel’s actions were not a result of 
“dilatory or aggressive litigation practices, but rather the 
legitimate zeal of attorneys representing their client.”  App. 
2868.  For these reasons, the District Court “vacat[ed] the 
Bankruptcy Court’s [orders imposing sanctions] and 
remand[ed] this matter for further proceedings consistent with 
this Memorandum Opinion.”  App. 2869. 
                                                                                                             
exhaustively addressing Prosser’s amended Adversary 
Complaint and the request for a referral of bribery allegations 
to the United States Attorney.  After thoroughly reviewing the 
extensive record before it, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed 
the claims against the remaining parties and concluded that 
disqualification or referral for criminal or disciplinary 
investigation were not warranted, as it could “find no 
evidence of a bribery scheme,” and while it was troubled by 
the use of estate assets to pay for a witness’s counsel without 
court approval, it noted that, in general, “there is nothing 
improper about a third party paying legal fees for” Stelzer.  
App. 2731. 
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On remand, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that, 
because the District Court had “found no bad faith” in the 
Prosser Counsel’s conduct, “it would be a waste of time to do 
anything other than comply with the District Court’s 
directions, which [it] read [to] require that, since the 
[sanctions] orders have been vacated, that the funds be 
returned.”  Supp. App. 921.  The Bankruptcy Court thereafter 
entered an order directing Carroll to release from escrow 
sanctions payments that had been made up to that point.  
Order, In re: Jeffrey J. Prosser, No. 3:10-ap-03001 (Bankr. 
D.V.I. Mar. 18, 2014), ECF No. 424. 
 
Carroll filed his Notice of Appeal on March 14, 2014, 
challenging the District Court’s February 14 order. 
 
II 
 
 We have jurisdiction over appeals from orders 
imposing sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1); see In 
re Miller, 730 F.3d 198, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2013).8  The 
                                                 
8 The District Court resolved the appeal of the 
sanctions order after all other relevant proceedings were 
concluded.  Thus, even if the appeal was premature when 
filed, there were no other relevant matters pending and hence 
it was ripe for adjudication by the time the District Court 
ruled.  Moreover, although the District Court’s order vacated 
the Bankruptcy Court’s order imposing sanctions and said it 
was remanding for further proceedings, its opinion stated that 
it was “revers[ing]” the sanctions decision, App. 2868, 
because it found, in essence, that no proceedings had been 
multiplied and no facts concerning bad faith had been 
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Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
157, and the District Court had jurisdiction to review the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  Our 
review requires us to “‘stand in the shoes’ of the District 
Court and review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision” to impose 
sanctions.  In re Pransky, 318 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting In re Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 
142 F.3d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1998)).  “The imposition or denial 
of sanctions is subject to abuse-of-discretion review.”  Miller, 
730 F.3d at 203.  “An abuse of discretion occurs when the 
court bases its opinion on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, 
an erroneous legal conclusion, or an improper application of 
law to fact.”  LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. First Conn. Holding Grp., 
                                                                                                             
established.  Because the District Court held that § 1927 
sanctions could not apply to the filing of an adversary 
complaint and that the facts did not support a finding of bad 
faith, the Bankruptcy Court reasonably concluded that the 
District Court’s decision left it with only ministerial tasks 
relating to the return of sanctions funds that had been placed 
in escrow.  See Supp. App. 921 (Bankruptcy Court stating: “I 
don’t know how I can find differently, even on a remand.  So 
I agree it would be a waste of time to do anything other than 
comply with the District Court’s directions, which I read 
require that, since the orders [imposing sanctions] have been 
vacated, that the funds be returned.”); see also In re Pransky, 
318 F.3d 536, 541 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting bankruptcy court on 
remand was not required to do additional fact-finding but 
only to perform ministerial mathematical calculations).  
Accordingly, because the Bankruptcy Court was required to 
perform only ministerial tasks on remand, the order vacating 
the sanctions award was a final order.  Pransky, 318 F.3d at 
540. 
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LLC, 287 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Pransky, 318 
F.3d at 542 (reviewing bankruptcy court’s “findings of fact 
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo”); In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 
278 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that bad faith under 
§ 1927 is a finding of fact reviewable for clear error). 
 
III 
 
Section 1927 provides: 
 
Any attorney or other person admitted to 
conduct cases in any court of the United States 
or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the 
proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to 
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, 
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because 
of such conduct. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1927.  Such “sanctions are intended to deter an 
attorney from intentionally and unnecessarily delaying 
judicial proceedings, and they are limited to the costs that 
result from such delay.”  LaSalle, 287 F.3d at 288 (emphasis 
omitted).  “[C]ourts should exercise this sanctioning power 
only in instances of a serious and studied disregard for the 
orderly process of justice.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and 
alteration omitted). 
 
 The language and purpose of the statute reflect that 
these sanctions are aimed at deterring lawyers’ bad faith 
conduct that disrupts the administration of justice by 
multiplying proceedings in “any court of the United States.”  
15 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1927.  A bankruptcy court is a unit of a district 
court, and as a result, it may impose § 1927 sanctions.  In re 
Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 105 (3d Cir. 2008).  
In the bankruptcy context, the proceedings include 
adjudication of both the bankruptcy petition and adversary 
proceedings, which are “essentially . . . self-contained 
trial[s]—still within the original bankruptcy case.”  In re 
Mansaray-Ruffin, 530 F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2008); see also 
In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 442-44, 449-50 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(affirming § 1927 sanctions for filing of baseless amended 
complaint in adversary action during bankruptcy).  Thus, the 
filing of an adversary complaint may multiply the 
proceedings in a bankruptcy case, as it can increase the cost 
of the entire bankruptcy proceeding of which it is a part. 
 
The District Court incorrectly held that the only 
proceeding that could have been multiplied here was the 
adversary proceeding.  This view both ignores the fact that 
the adversary proceeding was only a part of the bankruptcy 
case and fails to account for the barrage of other filings the 
Prosser Counsel submitted as part of the bankruptcy based on 
the very events that served as the basis for the Adversary 
Complaint.  Thus, the District Court erred in focusing only on 
the filing of the Adversary Complaint and holding that such a 
filing could not constitute sanctionable conduct under § 1927. 
 
Having concluded that the relevant proceedings 
include both the overarching bankruptcy and the associated 
adversary proceeding, we next examine whether the 
Bankruptcy Court’s imposition of § 1927 sanctions 
constituted an abuse of discretion.  To impose § 1927 
sanctions, a court must “find an attorney has (1) multiplied 
proceedings; (2) in an unreasonable and vexatious manner; 
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(3) thereby increasing the cost of the proceedings; and (4) 
doing so in bad faith or by intentional misconduct.”  
Prudential, 278 F.3d at 188.  A court imposing § 1927 
sanctions must find bad faith, but that finding need not be 
made explicitly.  Id. at 189 (“An implicit finding of bad faith 
will support sanctions just as well so long as it is not an abuse 
of discretion, not based upon clearly erroneous factual 
findings, and not based upon an error of law.”); see also 
Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 209 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (finding bad faith standard was met “in light of the 
entire record and the expressions of the district court judge, 
who employed the very words of the statute”).  “Indications 
of . . . bad faith are findings that the claims advanced were 
meritless, that counsel knew or should have known this, and 
that the motive for filing the suit was for an improper purpose 
such as harassment.”  Prudential, 278 F.3d at 188 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
We conclude that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse 
its discretion in imposing sanctions, as its order did not rest 
on “a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous legal 
conclusion, or an improper application of law to fact.”  
LaSalle, 287 F.3d at 288.  Under the clearly erroneous 
standard of review, the record supports the Bankruptcy 
Court’s finding that the Prosser Counsel had unreasonably 
and vexatiously multiplied and increased the cost of the 
proceedings in bad faith.9  First, the Prosser Counsel 
multiplied the proceedings.  The Adversary Complaint, 
                                                 
9 The District Court exceeded its appellate function by 
essentially substituting its view of the facts, rather than 
reviewing whether the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings 
were unsupported. 
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request for referral to the United States Attorney, Fee 
Objections, and Conflicts Motion created new issues for 
Carroll and the Bankruptcy Court to address.  Second, there is 
a basis for concluding that these filings were “unreasonabl[e] 
and vexatious[].”  Id.  These multiple filings were, as the 
Prosser Counsel admitted, prompted entirely by Stelzer’s 
deposition testimony that a third party was paying his legal 
fees and by Katz’s innocent mistake concerning Stelzer’s 
contact with Carroll, which was quickly clarified on the 
record.  As the Bankruptcy Court observed, the Prosser 
Counsel could have simply inquired into Stelzer’s fee 
arrangement and resolved any confusion regarding his dinner 
with Carroll without initiating an adversary proceeding, filing 
motions and objections, or alleging a vast bribery scheme.  
The Prosser Counsel’s failure to engage in such a reasonable 
inquiry to ensure their accusations had a basis in fact 
indicates that they engaged in objectively unreasonable 
conduct.  Furthermore, as the Bankruptcy Court stated in its 
opinion declining to refer the matter for criminal or 
disciplinary action, the Prosser Counsel’s process in 
advancing their bribery allegations was “suspect,” in that they 
initially filed the motion for an evidentiary hearing in the 
District Court despite the fact that the Bankruptcy Court had 
witnessed Stelzer’s deposition and had ordered the parties to 
address the issue, and despite the fact that the Prosser Counsel 
filed the Adversary Complaint after having reported the issue 
to the United States Attorney—part of the very relief they 
requested in their complaint.  Moreover, they issued press 
releases “in an apparent effort to discredit [opposing] 
counsel.”  App. 2654.  Third, the Prosser Counsel’s repeated 
filings based on a single fact that did not substantiate the 
bribery accusation plainly delayed and increased the cost of 
the bankruptcy proceeding, as the parties and the Bankruptcy 
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Court expended significant time and resources addressing 
them rather than the merits of the bankruptcy case.  Fourth 
and finally, although the Bankruptcy Court’s reasons for its 
finding of bad faith could have been more explicit, its finding 
was supported by both “the entire record” and its use of “the 
very words of the statute.”  Baker Indus., 764 F.2d at 209. 
 
The Prosser Counsel’s bribery accusations and the 
tactics they employed, from the press release to the request 
for a referral to law enforcement to the motions, objections, 
and Adversary Complaint, all show a desire to read nefarious 
motives into a relatively unremarkable event with no proof 
that the allegedly bribed witness had been influenced at all.   
In light of this record, the Bankruptcy Court’s factual finding 
of bad faith was not clearly erroneous, and the Court did not 
abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions under § 1927. 
 
IV 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order vacating the Bankruptcy Court’s imposition of 
sanctions and remand with instructions that the District Court 
reinstate the order imposing them. 
